Mavericks season preview: new offensive system, underlying logic and problems

Let’s talk seriously about the Lone Ranger.

Foreword

After selecting Cooper Flagg, Dallas created a very interesting lineup this offseason. They have deep reserves and large bodies at the center and power forward positions. With Flagg playing point guard, they can even field a super-large lineup with an average height of 207cm - this is a team with a strong frontcourt. But in comparison, with Irving injured, the back line appears a bit weak:

Klay Thompson is 35 years old. Russell is a player of some level, but his value has been declining in recent years, and this year he can only receive a mini-middle class (which to some extent illustrates his problem) - and behind them, there are only 3D players like Christie and players like Hardy who are obviously not good enough.

At a time when all teams are pursuing space, ball handling, and higher-level ball-holding abilities in the backcourt, the Mavericks have chosen to fill up the frontcourt configuration, pinning their hopes on the backcourt on Irving returning in better shape and Flagg growing into a true point forward.

Of course this is somewhat against the trend.

But from another perspective, they are very "modern" - although the overall size is large, the Lone Ranger is not bulky. They can put out a lineup that has size and switchability on the defensive end, or they can play fast on the offensive end. They have a lot of guys on the roster who can handle the ball and do some handling.

This team is somewhat reminiscent of the 2020 Lakers and the 2011 Mavericks-they will not make everyone optimistic. But if everything goes well, they undoubtedly have the talent to hit the high ceiling - because no matter what era, size, confrontation, and defense are always the "truths" in the playoffs.

So how will they behave?

In other words, how do they want to use their talents and turn them into victory?

We can get a glimpse of it from the preseason.

Overview

There should be no need to worry about the Mavericks' performance on the defensive end.

They have too many players who can provide high-quality frame protection. Not only AD, Lively, and Gafford, but Flagg and PJ Washington are also top frame protectors on the wings-this means that the Mavericks will be top in frontal frame protection and assist frame protection. At the same time, as mentioned above, these players are very agile. They can not only protect the rim, but also cover the court with their long arms and movement, disrupting the opponent's driving routes, passing and spot-up shooting - and quickly retreating from the defense.

Compared with their frontcourt defense, their leading defense is somewhat lagging behind. But this is not something that cannot be solved.

The Mavericks have enough defensive resources to defend against mistakes (but not just AD can defend against mistakes), defend against unlimited changes of defense, and defend against delays (even if an inside player is delayed, he still has enough frame protection ability behind him to protect the bottom) - these can help lead the defense. And as long as the Mavericks can protect the basket and guard the corners, punishing them by holding the ball for three-pointers, mid-range and wing fixation is a very high threshold in the regular season itself.

If that doesn't work, they can still take Christie - I just doubt whether they have the need to do so.

In short, I would be a little surprised if the Mavericks don't become a strong defensive team in the new season - it is not impossible. But let’s not make this assumption for the time being. If it does happen, we will discuss which link caused the problem.

Next, let’s talk about the aspect where the Lone Ranger needs to work more: offense.

The Mavericks are a team that lacks the ability to open up space.

Lively and Gafford are both insiders who can't shoot. Davis wants to be on the court with them, but Davis will also be left open by opponents beyond the three-point line. P.J. Washington and Flagg can shoot three-pointers, but the production and stability have not reached the level that opponents must defend. Almost all of the Mavericks' three-point shooting ability is concentrated on the relatively weak backcourt: Clay, Russell, and Christie.

The Mavericks generally only allow two of them to play at the same time (otherwise they have to bench their luxurious frontcourt). And if they choose to only play one of them (such as starting Flagg at point guard), the spacing will get even worse.

This results in the Lone Ranger rarely having a normal pick-and-roll offensive environment.

Take this round as an example.

Flagg and Davis cleared the pick-and-roll on one side. AD's screen caught George, who was leading the defense, and Flagg completely left him behind - but suddenly, he found that there were still four people in front of him.

Putting aside Bailey who inexplicably left Clay to help defend, Nurkic's position in this round basically represents the Mavericks' pick-and-roll environment - according to normal man-to-man defense, the defensive player (Nurkiqi) with a 45-degree angle on the wing in this round should stay above the free throw line and to the right, like this:

But what about the reality? Nurkic shrank to the top of the reasonable collision zone and was still moving to the left, almost standing in a frontal frame-protecting position.

Faced with this level of shrinkage, we can see that rookie Flagg is still more difficult to get out of the frame and is more inclined to choose techniques such as floaters or emergency-stop jumpers. At the same time, the passing route to AD is also blocked. The benefits of this offensive option are obviously reduced:

(Soon Alone The Xia again played an AD pick-and-roll with Flagg clearing one side. This round, they asked Lively to set a back screen for Washington in the corner, trying to force the Jazz to return to their normal defensive position - but we saw that the Jazz ignored you at all - if you want to pass to PJ in the corner, just pass it, you can't attack the frame anyway)

What should I do if the space is not good?

The Mavericks preseason showed two solutions.

1. Reduce the frequency of positional battles. Try hard to play early offense and transition fast breaks every possession.

The simplest and most direct way to solve the problem of stagnant space in positional battles is to speed up - try to avoid falling into positional battles too much, and try to use early attacks and transitions to defeat the opponent's unsteady footing. Virtually all teams in modern basketball are trying to do this. But not all teams have the talent of the Mavericks:

The Mavericks have twin towers, and both of them can protect the frame and get off the ball quickly, which means that they naturally have the perfect configuration for early offense.

Five years ago, the Los Angeles Lakers had success using this style of play - they were a team with the same lack of space. At that time, they also had two big men. Anthony Davis often went down quickly after switching defenses to interfere with shots. McGee/Howard/LeBron protected the rebound under the basket. After grabbing the rebound, LeBron/Rondo quickly passed the ball to Davis under the basket, forming a signature play of the Lakers:

In addition, they can also perform quick "Drag" pick-and-rolls and clear the "Empty" in the bottom corner. screen" and playing "Pistol" (pistol tactics) and other combinations.

Today, the Mavericks have a very similar configuration to the Lakers in those two years - Anthony Davis, another big man, a player who can get to the ball quickly and play quick pick-and-rolls (Flag/Russell) - they even have Jason Kidd and Frank Vogel, the coaches of the Lakers that year! (But the order of head coach and assistant coach is reversed)

We have already seen them replicate this offense in the preseason. A review will be carried out in subsequent articles.

In addition, not only the center position, the Mavericks also have many players suitable for playing fast in other positions.

They have many players with good rushing and finishing abilities in the open field: Davis, Flagg, PJ Washington, Marshall, and even Christie also has good physical fitness.

These players can dribble and hit the frame. It may not be easy to perform in half-court battles with stagnant space, but it's another story in transition - one-on-one in the open court, the confrontation and impact of AD, Flagg, and PJ can help them eat up most opponents - when they are on the court at the same time, there will be a lot of mismatches, and quick transitions and early attacks can help them better utilize their size advantages.

In addition, attacking the frame is not the only option for the Mavericks in fast offense - Klay Thompson may be one of the best conversion three-point shooters in history, and Russell is also good at converting offensive three-pointers - they can shoot directly and let the fast big man grab rebounds; they can also be used as a second option for handoffs after the frame is blocked.

However, no matter how fast you try to push. There will still be a lot of turns in a game where you are forced to fall out of position. And as the playoff rounds progress and opponents' ability to withdraw from defense improves, the proportion of positional battles will become higher and higher - so the Mavericks have also prepared methods to solve problems in positional battles:

2. Use high-post support inside to launch the offense. First, look for shooting opportunities and cutting opportunities for the shooter, and then use the shooter's containment to create singles opportunities to clear one side. (Also emphasizing resolute attack close out)

The Mavericks have many players who can play in the low post, and they also have two excellent shooters. However, their low post offensive players have flaws in their vision and ball-playing ability, and they are not that good at key positions. They cannot directly drive the team in the low post like Jokic or O'Neal.

So they "take the best and discard the dross" - let the big men use the screen as a pivot in the high post, not asking them to pass exquisite passes, but using their cover quality and the shooter's shooting threat to test the opponent's defensive position inside - if the shooter gets space, they will shoot, if the shooter does not get it To the space, it means that the opponent's inside may have left the penalty area, and you can move down/let another inside player perform a quick low post/face-to-frame singles:

This round is the opening tactic of the Mavericks against the Lakers, and it is somewhat representative - the Mavericks adopt a 5-out formation to attack.

The first threat of the tactic: the three people on the line cooperate. Lively hand-offs to Flagg, and then Flagg dribbles to Klay who comes out from the wing - here forms the prototype of a "Miami" tactic:

"Miami", that is, the shooter from the wing/bottom corner comes out, first screen the dribbling player, and then receives a cover shot or breakthrough from the center at the top of the arc.

We can see that the first move of the Mavericks above is exactly this tactic - but here is the difference: the Mavericks do not want this to be just a simple "Miami", so Clay did not choose to use Lively's screen, but chose to refuse the screen (Reject) and cut inside - if Vincent chooses to grab the screen in advance, Clay will get the opportunity to cut for a layup.

But Vincent did not lose his position, so the Mavericks quickly entered the second tactical design: "STS" (screen the screener, screen the screener).

After Klay cut in and realized there was no chance, he immediately cut to the elbow area and provided a screen for Davis at a 45-degree angle, allowing Davis to cut into the left low post. At the same time, he quickly cut outside after the screen and used Lively's screen to shoot. The tactical diagram is as follows:

This "Miami+STS" tactic can create multiple scoring opportunities - Klay three-pointers, Klay cutting in, AD receiving the ball in the low post for quick singles, Klay cutting shots - the Mavericks scored through the last method in this round, because the Lakers chose to double-team AD when Klay was covering AD. Actual players can freely choose the finishing method according to the defense.

And this is a perfect embodiment of the Lone Ranger's offensive concept..

Next, through review, we will let you have a more concrete experience of the Mavericks' early offense and positional offense, and talk about the Mavericks' problems.

Early Attack/Conversion Quick Play

Let’s start with the most iconic fast-down early attack:

The Mavericks’ first goal in the preseason came from Davis’s iconic fast-down early attack—this round is very iconic. AD was at the top of the key, and Flagg blocked the opponent's layup as a baseline help defender. AD immediately came down quickly, and Russell advanced and sent an alley-oop.

There is also such a round in the second game.

The Mavericks got the rebound, PJ Washington immediately threw it forward to Marshall, Flagg pointed forward, Marshall dribbled forward quickly - AD had been waiting under the basket for a long time, Marshall lobbed, AD took off and dunked hard.

Flagg also often became the target of quick catches in the Mavericks' early offense.

It was still the case that everyone advanced quickly after the defense was successful - Flagg took the lead and ran in front. Russell observed during the dribbling process. When he saw Flagg running out of the space, he immediately made a long pass from the midfield. Flagg took off and smashed the ball with both hands.

These two rounds also vividly demonstrate the Mavericks' early attack style - after getting the ball, Flagg will quickly take long strides and step down quickly, and the Mavericks will quickly give the ball to players with the ability to pass long, and they will send long passes to Flagg who is rushing down.

It can be seen that a lineup with insufficient talent and discipline is unable to withstand this talent-crushing style of play. The Lakers' third lineup has no time to find the correct matchup when retreating - Flagg can easily get misplaced (because the average team on the upper line, that is, the first line of defense is usually small players), and in the open field, Flagg is almost impossible to defend against small players.

Not only Flagg and Davis can be targets in the early attack, Liveley, PJ Washington and other players may actually play this role:

In this round, Lively took on the role of quickie in the early attack— -Although he did not save the shot, we can see that Lively's sprint speed is very fast, which is enough to help him surpass most of the inside opponents - Lively cuts inside from the top of the arc, and the opponent has to have someone to watch him, so Christie in the bottom corner gets a wide open opportunity.

And what if the opponent does not have enough people to retreat and is unwilling to leave the bottom corner?

The result, of course, was Lively catching the ball and dunking.

(Liveley ran really fast this round...)

This is what the Mavericks have been doing in the preseason: taking advantage of the talent and depth advantages of their own lineup (the Mavericks' lineup depth is very good), testing the opponent's retreat speed, talent and physical fitness.

We have reason to believe that they will continue to do this in the regular season.

Of course, there are many other offensive methods for early offense and transition offense:

For example, AD's reverse pick-and-roll was a very common style of play for the Lakers last season.

AD directly carries the ball from the backcourt to the frontcourt. Powell positions himself inside and outside on the weak side. Christie comes up from the bottom corner of the strong side to provide a ghost screen, forming an empty side. AD uses this space to change directions and rush straight to the basket. He turns around to bypass the help defense and scores with a throw, showing his guard skills.

Still positioned one inside and four outside, AD settled in the slot, PJ Washington came over and played a hand-off with AD at the top of the arc (DHO). AD used the small space brought by the screen to accelerate the breakthrough, push away Markkanen, and hit the mid-range shot.

There is also the following expansion method:

AD is also holding the ball through half the court, positioning one inside and four outside. Russell comes up to AD to reverse the pick-and-roll. The opponent double-teams Davis, so Davis passes back to Russell who pops out (Pop) and hits a three-pointer.

In addition, there is the back door air cut in the transition attack:

In the preseason, this tactic was mainly executed by Christie - Xiao Ke would quickly move a step in the direction of Russell, making the opponent think he was going to pick and roll with Russell or hand over hand, but then Christie immediately ran back door and cut.

This trick has been tried and tested against the Thunder's third lineup.

They also tried a lot of transition attacks.

Flagg transforms into a dragon.

Washington converted one dragon.

Even Christie has such a transition from the backcourt to a one-stop and a half attack.

As mentioned above - the Mavericks have many players who are difficult to stop in the open court. And you can find that these rounds are all multi-line fast breaks.

Constantly trying to speed up, judging from the preseason, it has really brought out the Mavericks' athletic ability and size advantage, bringing many extra scoring opportunities to the Mavericks.

The following are some simple examples:

Flagg quickly pushed and half-switched, attracting two defenders, so PJ Washington, who cut in, had the opportunity to go straight to the basket and challenge the frame protection.

Clay quickly pushed the transition. The opponent was not stable in retreating and chose to block the basket first, so Flagg got the opportunity to attack for a close out dunk..

Flagg quickly counterattacked after stealing. Although he failed to rush to the frame, many teammates followed up. Powell received the pass and got a layup opportunity;

It was another steal and fast break. Flagg dribbled the ball and sprinted, surpassing many defensive players along the way, attracting the opponent's defense to shrink, and Marshall followed up with the ball. Marshall then attacked close out, attracting help from defense and assisting Lively for a layup.

After stealing and counterattacking, Flagg dribbled and sprinted to attract the defense - in order to defend him, the opponent had to let go of Klay Thompson who was about to leave, and Klay hit a three-pointer.

What we can notice is that the Mavericks' quick down transition is not only performed by their most physically fit players, but also the speed of the entire team - all players on the team will sprint with all their strength the moment they get the rebound, forming a multi-line fast break. Moreover, there are players with different threats in the fast break - there are players who go down quickly without the ball, there are players who go down quickly with the ball, there are shooters who shoot three-point conversions, there are also players who come up to make fake screens and cuts, and players who follow up.

This undoubtedly makes their transition offense more difficult to defend.

The capital they use to do this is their depth.

"This gives our entire team more confidence - because we know that opponents will be shocked by the depth of our lineup. The starting lineup is no problem, and our starting five is very good. Coupled with the bench lineup, I think we may be one of the deepest teams in the league." Christie said.

The sample size in the preseason is small, and we look forward to seeing more of the Mavericks' early attack/switching style in the future.

Next let’s talk about positional warfare.

High post support/off-ball screen/cutting in with clear side singles

In the above overview, we have already talked about the Mavericks like to use high post support inside to start the offense and why they like to do this. Next, we will look at some cases and signature tactics in detail:

The first round of the Mavericks preseason was a high-post handoff in the 5-out position - Lively was in Flagg's ball slot. Russell inserted from the wing into the center to create a "Wedge" screen for Flagg at the top of the arc. After the defense was switched, Lively and Lively immediately handed off shots.

This is what I said in my overview - using the shooter's shooting threat to test the opponent's defensive position inside - like this round, if the Thunder's inside is not available, Russell will get an open shot.

Keep watching.

Of course, the high-level support is not limited to hand-to-hand.

The Mavericks will also let AD hold the ball in the slot, because AD has the ability to hold the ball in singles from outside the three-point line, so the Mavericks choose to let Flagg cut to the other side along the baseline to clear the space on one side for AD - What if Flagg's help defender does not leave the strong side? We have seen this kind of clearing before when writing the pick and roll - let AD pass the ball directly to find Flagg who uses the "Exit" screen to cut to the bottom corner.

Although such a pass is difficult to a certain extent - we have seen that AD is still capable of completing it.

In the follow-up, Flagg can shoot, attack close out and then attack the frame or pass the ball.

Because it is impossible for inside players to attack the frame/get off quickly in the whole game, and they also have to take into account defense, the Mavericks seem to focus on saving energy for their ball-carrying stars on the offensive end - the performance is that they will tirelessly seek some off-ball cover tactics designed for shooters:

The following is a good example.

This is a 24-second round for the Mavericks, but it can be seen very clearly what they want to play on the offensive end - first AD and Flagg pass hands in the slot, while Russell cuts in from the slot on the other side - this is the start of this move. The first opportunity to attack, but Russell did not get an open space, so Clay came up from the bottom corner to "Shake" to fill Russell's position. Flagg quickly returned the ball to Davis and gave Clay another "Chicago" (off-ball screen + hand-off screen).

This is a round with some Princeton offensive concepts - one inside and four outside positions, with one inside man in the slot to provide support, and the team cuts around him, screens without the ball, and refills the position (Fill) - except that usually Princeton's high post support is "one inside", and in this round, the player supported by the Mavericks became Davis in the "four outside".

So what concept of the Lone Ranger can be seen in this round?

I think it's because they don't want to easily fall into the "solve the problem with singles" step. If possible, they still hope to make more use of the threat of Davis to create opportunities for other players in the lineup, thereby achieving the purpose of reducing the burden on the core - AD is already a veteran. His style of play is very taxing on the body, so the Mavericks don't want him to take on too much too soon.

In the first few games of the preseason, AD's low scoring is precisely related to this. In the last two games, you can clearly feel that AD is more "effortful" - in addition to more personal offense and tactical weight, this is also reflected in the fact that he is more responsible for hard solutions after tactical failures:

In the last game of the preseason against the Lakers, there was no hand-to-hand between Lively and Clay on the line. After the opportunity, the Mavericks quickly handed the ball to Davis who came up from the bottom corner. At the same time, Flagg, who originally cut to the right corner, quickly cut back to the left corner to clear one side for Davis. The Lakers were still afraid of Flagg's shooting in the bottom corner to a certain extent. Vincent did not stay in the penalty area to help defend, so Davis easily beat Hachimura in the low post.

This is an "Iverson cut" tactic (setting up double screens on both sides of the high post for weak-side cross-cutting players). But Christie had no chance, so he immediately dribbled to the right to break through. At the same time, Washington, who was high on the right, also immediately moved forward - their intention? Clearing space for Davis to hit the top of the arc for a single.

Subsequently, the moment the space appeared, Christie passed back to Davis. Davis received the ball and immediately broke through with hesitation, causing Hayes to foul..

This is another tactic with a bit of a Princeton concept - but the difference is that in this round, after a series of air cuts, hand-offs, pindown screens, and exit screens without a chance, the Mavericks gave the ball to Davis in the low post without any hesitation. (Of course, this is also related to Davis's huge misalignment at the beginning of this round)

Then Davis played in low singles, and the Lakers could only double-team, so Davis passed the ball inside Lively and scored from the basket.

This round is more simple and clear - no chance of handover on the line? It doesn't matter, just open up space for Davis. Davis immediately turned around and hit a single.

Through these rounds, we can clearly see the offensive concept of the Mavericks - it is what I said at the beginning: use the high position inside to support the offense, first seek shooting opportunities and cutting opportunities for the shooter, and then use the shooter's containment to create singles opportunities to clear one side. Don't let your opponent comfortably stand in a help-defense position.

Next, let’s take a look at some of the more iconic fixed tactics played by the Mavericks in the preseason:

This is a "Cross Screen" (cross screen under the basket) + "Stagger" (double screen without the ball) tactic. It is the fixed tactic that I have recorded that the Mavericks played the most in the preseason.

The core purpose is what we have been emphasizing in this chapter - the big man covers for the shooter to create opportunities for the shooter, and at the same time the shooter's running opens up space for the big man.

Why did Flagg catch the ball in the low post in this round and the players facing AD and Powell did not immediately help defend/double-team? Naturally, it's not because they are afraid of AD and Powell's shooting - but because they are afraid of Klay's "Stagger" and need to be ready to save and interfere with Klay at any time. (Of course, the final execution of this round was not very good)

The Mavericks soon played this tactic again. This time, Russell took on the role of a running shooter, but it was resolved by the Thunder's defense change. At the same time, since Christie was in the low post, he had no chance. In the end, he could only pass Lively back. Russell and Lively played a hand-off, and Christie, who shook the ball, missed a three-pointer.

This round actually involves some "issues" that I will talk about later. And we can also see the Mavericks' emphasis on creating outside shooting opportunities and the Princeton concept in the early preseason.

Don’t mention it for now and continue looking at tactics.

This time the tactic was more successful. Clay successfully used the screen to get inside and caused a foul.

Against the Jazz, the Mavericks also used this tactic in the opening game - this time after Kresstagger received the ball, Davis cleared the singles on one side after passing "Flare" back.

Of course, if the opponent's defense is not focused, this tactic also has the option of scoring directly through the first "Cross" screen.

In the last game, we can still clearly see that the Mavericks increased the proportion of AD's personal offense in their tactics - AD in this round cleared one side of the singles more resolutely than in the previous rounds.

In addition, the Mavericks also played a lot of pin down and air cutting tactics:

Lively provided support from the high post, Flagg pretended to hand over, but actually provided a pin down screen for Clay in the bottom corner, and Clay caught the ball and shot.

Lively is still holding the ball in the slot, playing hand-to-hand with Davis at the 4-5 position, pretending to be down, but actually setting a pin down screen for Clay - the two create space for each other.

Lively received the ball at the top of the arc and dealt the card. Flagg pinned Russell on the weak side - the Lakers double-teamed Russell, so Flagg immediately "popped" the ball and broke through the attack to close out the lever for a layup.

Also uses cover to allow the shooter and the covering frontcourt player to create space for each other to prevent the other party from comfortably standing in a help defense position.

The tactics of the air-cutting series.

Lively held the ball in the high post to provide support. Christie took a step towards him and pretended to hand over the ball. Then he immediately ran back and cut in the air, receiving the pass and scoring.

It’s the same tactic again. Christie failed to get a chance in this round, so he used the opportunity to make a "Flex" screen for AD in the bottom corner, allowing AD to cut into the middle. AD received the ball and ended with a single.

Soon the Mavericks played another air-cutting tactic - Lively held the ball in the high post, Flagg pretended to be a pin down for Clay and suddenly cut in. Then Clay sprinted towards Lively in the high post, pretending to take over and hand over the shot, but he also immediately reversed and made a V-cut cut, completely deceiving the defensive player, catching the ball and scoring a layup.

In this round against the Lakers, Clay ran a slot cut first, and then Flagg pretended to hand over a hand with a v cut, and Vanderbilt cut in and dunked, which was also very classic.

Of course, there are many more tactics for the Mavericks, but I think the above-mentioned signature plays can present the concept of their offensive system very clearly. For reasons of space, more tactics will not be shown one by one.

Next, let’s talk about some problems exposed by the Mavericks’ preseason offense and my opinions.

Question

Regarding the team's space problem, the solution given by the Mavericks coaching staff is not unreasonable. The tactical design is to the point, diverse and varied enough - but does this mean that they will definitely be able to solve the problems caused by the lineup?

I still don’t think so.

In my opinion, there is an obvious problem in the Mavericks' offensive system - that is, there is a lack of players with sufficient execution ability in some tactical links.

Or to put it bluntly, some of their players are not good enough.

For example, the passing session.

Although they have many players who can pass the ball, the quality of their passing is not stable:

These two rounds are good examples.

Davis went down quickly after interfering with the shot, and also had a mismatch at the basket. It was supposed to be a landmark early offensive round, but it ended in a mistake-the reason was that Russell's pass was not fast and accurate enough.

In this round, the iconic high-post support was used. Christie cut into the frame and then slipped to the baseline to use the exit cover-why didn't the three-point opportunity from the corner come out in the end?

It's not because the screens and air cuts are not good enough, it's because Hardy, who is responsible for controlling the ball at the top of the arc, doesn't know the timing of passing the ball well.

Subsequently, in the off-ball cover tactic arranged for Clay from the sideline, Hardy once again made an outrageous pass.

Hardy's ball-holding level does not support his tactical threat at all - he can only execute it mechanically, regardless of whether his teammates are really in a good position - Washington's close out attack failed in this round. Most of the reason is that Hardy did not attract help from the flanks at all, and even brought in extra defenders.

I know some fans may say, "Is Hardy still worth criticizing?"

But the cruel fact is that with Irving's return date undecided and Exum playing off and on for a long time, the Mavericks' point guards behind Russell are indeed only Hardy and rookie Nembhard Jr.

And the situation of "insufficient quality of players" does not only occur in the passing link - the Mavericks' offensive system hopes that shooters can carry the production, but Klay Thompson is no longer the 37-point single quarter he was. His explosive power in the legs has declined significantly, and his shooting speed and shooting stability have declined compared to the peak. Russell also has stability problems in higher-level games, and may also be unable to play due to defense - the Mavericks cannot ensure that they have high-quality shooters on the field for 48 minutes.

Therefore, they even had to let Christie, who is more focused on the spot, perform some running shooter tactics. The effect can be imagined:

(Christie played "Chicago" and the ball stalled)

The same problem of "taking on too difficult a task" also happened to other players:

Flagg wants to serve as a three-pointer with the ball, but his confidence and shot speed are not stable; Davis is cosplaying with Sabonis, and obviously his passing is not always that good;

The Mavericks' offense emphasizes resolute attack close out. But Hardy's combination of breaking through Marshall's fixed-point breakthrough obviously does not work every time;

PJ Washington advances the transition and crushes the mismatch - but when the help defense comes, he passes the ball out, and the players in the bottom corners are not always able to convert these passes into assists;

Christie's sudden break-up and fixed-point breakthrough by Marshall. Such a combination couldn't even break through Kroc's defense.

In the last preseason game, when both the Mavericks and their opponents were more serious, the Mavericks turned many of their exquisite offensive tactics into "AD singles in different areas" - this is actually not a good signal.

This reflects that although the Lone Ranger's tactical design is clever, in fact, the strongest ability to break defenses is in their finishing links-that is, Davis and Flagg.

Early attacks, air cuts, running three-pointers, transition three-pointers (the Mavericks' most successful game was 52 three-pointers), and close out attacks. You will find that most of what the Mavericks rely on are content with relatively low "defense-breaking ability."

They don’t have “two cups of poison” or “unsolvable killer move” in the true sense.

Therefore, they do not pursue the exquisiteness of the offensive round or complete open opportunities. They give the impression that they only want to seize some "moderate" opportunities before the opponent's positional battle is completely completed - they seem to know that they will not become a top offensive team, and they just want to prevent themselves from becoming the worst offensive team.

What their offensive system is actually pursuing is a "golden mean" on the basketball court.

Maybe the Lone Ranger has adopted the "best plan", but we also have an old saying in China, called "A clever woman can't make a meal without rice" - before Kyrie Irving returns, some concerns about offense are not unreasonable.

For this team, offense determines the upper limit and defense determines the lower limit - the Mavericks' offensive style is like acknowledging that they are a strong defensive team.

If they are, then I don't think it would be difficult for them to maintain a mid-table/mid-lower offense. Performance shouldn't be a problem either. But if they're not - that's a problem.

So, for the Mavericks, their theme for the first half of the season will be: "Put extra effort (defense and speed) to stabilize the record as much as possible, and wait for the return of a key player to make a qualitative change in the team. At the same time, pray that the current core players will not suffer injuries."

Wait... Is this plot a bit familiar to Anthony Davis?